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From the Tokyo to Khabarovsk trials: the history of the preparation of the trial of Japanese war criminals and bacteriologist

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At the beginning of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which convened in Tokyo on April 29, 1946, little was known about Japanese biological weapons. It was only in August of 1946 that the US prosecution was able to provide the court with information about the biological warfare research and human experimentation conducted by the Japanese military. The court, however, demanded more evidence. Initially, the American prosecution appealed to the Soviets for cooperation in its criminal inquiry into Japanese war atrocities, and the USSR considered sending a group of prisoners of war from Soviet camps to Japan as witnesses at the Tokyo trials. However, the American approach soon changed and the United States refused to cooperate with the Soviet Union in bringing the Japanese bacteriologists to trial. This was due to the fact that the US military gradually began to discover the scale and value of the secret information held by the Japanese. They intended to acquire this information in exchange for legal immunity for key figures of the Japanese germ warfare program that they were holding, including Shiro Ishii and his colleagues, who had managed to flee the primary research center, Unit 731 in Manchuria. As a result, Moscow decided to organize a separate tribunal in the USSR. The outbreak of the Cold War and the growing tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States had a major impact on the way this tribunal was conducted. Nevertheless, the trial, which was held in Khabarovsk from December 25‒30, 1949, was the only trial of Japanese military members who were involved in varying degrees in the development and testing of biological weapons on humans as well as carrying out other horrific medical experiments.

Keywords: Tokyo Trials, bacteriological weapons, Unit 731, Ishii Shiro, human experimentation, Japanese war criminals, Khabarovsk Trial

In December 1949, a trial was held in Khabarovsk for a group of Japanese prisoners of war accused of manufacturing and using biological weapons. This historical tribunal uncovered crimes involving the development and use of weapons outlawed by the Geneva Protocol of July 17, 1925, as well as evidence of inhumane experiments carried out on human subjects. Twelve defendants were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment.

Despite the fact that the trial took place over half a century ago, there is little information about it in the domestic historical literature, and all of it, to varying degrees, reiterates the official Soviet view [1‒4]. It is clear that the inadequate attention given by historians to this event is largely explained by the fact that a significant number of archived Russian sources pertaining to the emergence and implementation of the ideas put into place by the Khabarovsk Tribunal remain inaccessible to researchers.

The lack of data relating directly to the events in question is also notable in foreign historical research. An exception may be made for an article by the Belorussian author Vladimir Barishev, but even this work relies on already published sources and fails introduce any new data [5]. In Japan the scientific research of Tsuneisi Keichii has garnered significant interest [6, p. 26]. Of note are the works published in the USSR by Japanese authors H. Akiyama [7]1 and S. Morimura [8]2. We are unaware of any sort of research dedicated to this topic conducted by American historians. An article by journalist John Powell published in October 1981, however, could be considered significant.

The present paper, based on national archival material that has been introduced into academic

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1 It should be noted that the recollections of this former Japanese serviceman, who started working in Unit 731 when he was 17, were published under a pseudonym. The author’s real name is unknown.

scholarship and foreign publications, explores the origin, development, and realization of the Soviet plan to bring Japanese war criminals and bacteriologists to justice.

Following the conclusion of the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, a trial of Japanese war criminals, took place in Tokyo with the participation of representatives from eleven countries, including the USSR. It was held in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander of Allied Occupational Forces, American General Douglas MacArthur, from May 3, 1946 until November 12, 1948. American representative Joseph Keenan was named the main prosecutor in the trial and the arraignment began June 4, 1946.

Although both the Americans and Soviets had gathered information during the war indicating that the Japanese Army was in possession of biological weapons, the evidence was nonetheless scarce, prompting the intelligence services of both countries to search for evidence as quickly as possible. According to historian Tsuneisi Keiichi, the Americans assembled a special search party shortly after the conclusion of military action under the command of Colonel Murray Sanders, an expert from the American biological weapons program at Fort Detrick. This group uncovered a number of individuals in Japan who were in possession of certain scientific and technological information, including a significant number of members of the notorious Unit 731, lead by Shiro Ishii. Shortly before Manchuria was occupied by the Soviet Army, the unit was able to evacuate to Korea, taking with it a portion of its records. All of the unit’s equipment and facilities, as well as any human subjects who survived the medical experiments, were destroyed [9, p. 45]. Ishii later moved from Korea to Japan, where he was discovered by the Americans.

Shiro Ishii was the mastermind and principle organizer of the Japanese biological weapons program. Ishii completed medical school at the Kyoto Imperial University in 1920, and after his postgraduate studies, he worked as an attending physician at a local military hospital until he was sent on a long tour of duty abroad. By the end of 1930, Ishii had visited almost every European country, including the USSR, where he familiarized himself with the work of medical and scientific research institutes in Moscow and Leningrad. Upon returning from his trip, he began to actively campaign for the necessity of preparing Japan for biological warfare. He was motivated by the fact that, in his opinion, all the countries he visited were strengthening their research in the field of bacteriology, and Japan might find itself unprepared in the event of a war. In 1933 Ishii’s idea found a supporter in Major General Nagata, the Head of the Japanese Department of Military Affairs [11].

Throughout September and October 1945, Sanders interviewed ten former members of Unit 731 and compiled a report based on the interviews [10, p. 192]. However, the Japanese had strict orders on what they could and could not say to the Americans in such circumstances. Tsuneisi Keiichi discovered written instructions to General Kitano, who served as the commander of Unit 731 after Shiro Ishii (from August 1942 to May 1945), specifying that the “American investigation had uncovered neither human experiments nor the development and testing of bacteriological weapons” and instructing members to adhere this story during interrogation [10, p. 196].

Colonel Arvo Thompson, Sanders’s replacement, having interrogated both Kitano and Ishii, also noticed that all those questioned appeared to be bound by orders of nondisclosure [10, p. 197]. At the end of May 1946, Thompson submitted the group’s final report, thereby concluding its investigation. The task of collecting information related to Japanese war crimes was subsequently taken over by the legal department of the General Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Douglas MacArthur, [10, p. 198].

As for the Soviet investigation, it is difficult to determine to what extent they were aware of the situation before the summer of 1946 due to the absence of documentation. It is known that sanitation inspectors and bacteriologists who were embedded in Soviet Army units occupying Manchuria were aware of “the presence of a number of bacteriological installations, well-fitted with equipment and necessary chemicals, at the disposal of the Kwantung Army.” It was noted that “their dislocation and scale markedly exceed the usual need for anti-epidemic inspection” [12, p. 269; 13]. However, a full investigation of this matter was likely not conducted.
This lack of investigation might be explained by the fact that the massive evacuation from Japan to the USSR of around 600,000 prisoners of war and their placement in camps caused unequivocal hardships. For example, the leadership of Camp Number 16, located in Khabarovsk, later noted that in the period of massive influx of former service members from the Kwantung Army, a system of records failed to be properly established. As a result, “prisoners of war in the first period... had the full ability to hide their true first and last names, their positions, and other basic data” [14]. One might suppose that in the camp where Japanese generals were held — Sensitive Site Number 45 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the Khabarovsk Krai — information was more reliable. It was still necessary, however, to actively search this camp for participants of the biological weapons program.

Meanwhile at the Tokyo Tribunal, the charges prepared by the Americans were well received. The Americans were also tasked with representing the interests of Kuomintang China.

At the behest of the Americans, on July 6, 1946, the main Soviet prosecutor present at the International Military Tribunal, Sergei Golunsky, sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with a request to “conduct an interrogation of Kajitsuka Ryuji, the former head of the Kwantung Army’s sanitation department, on the question of Japanese experiments with toxic gasses on Chinese laborers in Harbin between 1934–1940” [15, p. 310]. In early August 1946 Lieutenant-General Kajitsuka Ryuji was interrogated as a witness. He affirmed that he and his subordinates were responsible for the management of the water supply and the fight against epidemics but failed to mention anything about the development of biological weapons. Kajitsuka listed the names of several of his subordinates, who were summarily searched for throughout the Soviet camps; however, as it turned out, the subordinates in question had no connection whatsoever to the investigation at hand [15, p 335; 16, p. 64, 65].

At the end of August 1946 a key event for our research occurred at the Tokyo trials. In his statement from August 29, David N. Sutton, the aide to the American prosecutor, read a text detailing the crimes committed by the Japanese Army against the Chinese population and spoke of the use of civilian prisoners in medical laboratories. In his words, this was one of the most secret organizations, and therefore the number killed could not be accurately determined [17, p. 161]. This American accusation raised a question from the President of the Tribunal William Webb: could Sutton provide additional evidence of the existence of these alleged laboratory experiments or was he content with the evidence he had? “This is something completely new that we have not yet heard about,” explained Webb. However, Sutton’s answer was sufficiently short: “at this time we do not suppose to provide additional evidence on this count” [17, p. 162].

Thanks to the testimony of Lev Smirnoff, who entered the Tokyo trials on the side of the Soviet prosecution, a report of the savage crimes perpetrated by Japanese aggressors attracted the attention of the International Tribunal, and the American prosecution was asked to provide the court with more evidence of the criminal activities of the aforementioned unit [10, p. 198; 18, p. 442].

By this time the Soviet side already possessed reasonably strong evidence. At their disposal was witness’ testimony from the prisoner of war, Major-General Kiyoshi Kawashima of the medical service, who formerly served as the head of the manufacturing division of Unit 731 from 1941 until March 1943. During the very first interrogation on August 11, 1946, Kawashima gave a detailed description of his operations. Questioning continued throughout August and September, over the course of which it came to light that research projects carried out in the unit, including human experiments and the process of growing bacteria in larger quantities, “were without a doubt aimed at finding effective means for carrying out a bacteriological attack on the enemy” [12, p. 237]. He revealed that the victims of inhumane experiments were not only Chinese, but “evidently there were also Mongols, Russians, and different nationalities” [12, p. 243]. The general also reported results of experiments on the immune system of the human body, enhanced effectiveness of anti-plague and typhus vaccines, and others [12, p. 239].

Evidence presented by prisoner of war Karasawa Tomio proved to be especially valuable. Tomio was a major in the medical service and the
former commander of the independent 4th division of Unit 731 and was questioned as a witness on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 30th of September 1946 [12, p. 232]. During his questioning, Tomio spoke in detail about the unit’s size, structure, primary assignments, and methods of operation, as well as the role of Shiro Ishii in the development of biological weapons [12, p. 249]. Tomio’s evidence was directed toward military bacteriological specialists [12, p. 269].

Thanks to the compelling evidence obtained in the investigation, criminal activity on the part of the Japanese to develop bacteriological weapons and use them on human targets became clear. Having obtained this evidence, the Soviet prosecutor at the Tokyo trials, A.N. Vasiliev, sent an inquiry to Moscow on October 29, 1946 concerning the possibility of delivering these two witnesses to Japan. Previously, investigators had not sent full transcripts of the interrogations to Tokyo, but rather a kind of digest: the results of Karasawa’s four interrogations were compiled into one short record which left out all the technical details of the activities of the bacteriologists [12, p. 232].

In the record, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Y.A. Malik appealed to the Governmental Commission on the Guidance of Work of Soviet Representatives in the International Military Tribunal on November 5, 1946 with the request to review this question [12, p. 213]. The opinion of the Minister of Internal Affairs Sergei Kruglov was unambiguous: “The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR believes that sending Kawashima and Karasawa to Tokyo as a witness to the prosecution in the Tokyo trials to be undesirable” [12, p. 232].

It is obvious that only a limited circle was included in this secret investigation. Only thus, it seems, is it possible to explain the contents of a letter from December 6, 1946 from the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Far Eastern Division II, N.I. Generalov, and the senior assistant to the main attorney of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Colonel S.Y. Rosenblit, to the aforementioned commission. In particular, it was written that “upon the request of the Americans, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs into the questions connected with the Japanese preparation for bacteriological war and experiments in the application of bacteriological agents on the Chinese. Gathered materials (interrogation transcripts of two Japanese prisoners of war) were sent to Tokyo and presented to the head prosecutor Keenan, who considered it desirable to use the evidence of two Japanese prisoners of war in court — Kawashima Kioshi and Karasawa Tomio with the delivery of both to the Tribunal in order to offer testimony. Comrade Vasiliev believes the use of these materials in court and the delivery of these two witnesses to Tokyo to be appropriate. We tend to agree with the opinion of comrade Vasiliev” [12, p. 317].

Soon, however, prosecutor A.N. Vasiliev wrote from Tokyo: “Yesterday I received an official answer from Keenan’s assistant saying that they feel the use of these materials is impossible, clarifying that, in their opinion, it cannot be proven that this preparation was run under orders or at least with the knowledge of the accused and that there aren’t any other confirmatory materials, but only personal material insufficient to substantiate an accusation” [12, p. 322].

At the next session on December 19, the commission, under the guidance of the Tokyo legal proceedings, reviewed the question “about biological warfare.” It was decided “to send a telegram to Vasiliev about the importance of this issue and how it is politically beneficial for us to use the material on biological warfare at the Tribunal. Ask Vasiliev for detailed information on the motives of the American refusal to use these materials on biological warfare. If the Americans officially decline these witnesses, then it follows for us to call them to testify on their own behalf and cease to deal with the Americans with regards to this question” [12, p. 342]. On December 20, 1946 the commission sent an order to the assistant to the main prosecutor, Lev Smirnoff, commanding him to “re-interrogate” Karasawa and Kawashima in Vladivostok, an order with which Smirnoff complied. Furthermore it was deemed necessary for the prisoners of war to be “transported to Japan on the condition of their return to the USSR” [19].

It has been possible to establish the subsequent course of events thanks to the declassification of archived documents from America introduced into the scholarly literature by Tsuneisi Keiichi. On January 7, 1946 Vasiliev sent a letter to
Major-General Willoughby, the head of the Department of the General Staff of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces MacArthur, who was responsible for gathering information on war crimes committed by the Japanese Army. Contained in the letter was a request concerning the extradition of General Ishii. According to a Japanese professor, Vasiliev’s query should have come as a shock to analysts from Fort Detrick and the American General Staff conducting the first investigation. Thanks to the contents of the Soviet demand, it became clear that, first of all, they did not reveal facts about the use of biological weapons against Russians and Chinese, and secondly, medical experiments on humans proceeded only in circumstances where it appeared the victims were going to be killed [10, p. 199].

The requests made by the Soviet Union were actively discussed by the American State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shortly after, on January 17, while the American government continued to deliberate about how to react to the Soviet request, there was a meeting between representatives of the USSR and the USA. Included on the agenda for this meeting was the Soviet request [10, p. 199]. Here it is possible that an agreement was reached regarding the possibility of Soviet investigators interrogating General Ishii, his former colleague Colonel Oota, and other witnesses. An indirect confirmation of our hypothesis can be found in the form of a document from the Archive of Internal Politics of the Russian Federation that indicates an agreement was received from the Americans on this topic in January 1947 [19, p. 116‒118]. It is curious that Morimura included in his book excerpts from a telegram sent in this context from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington to the Supreme Commander of American Forces in Japan, MacArthur. The telegram indicated in particular that questioning “could be permitted under your control on the following conditions...”: the presence of an American representative during interrogation and also preparatory instructions about what can and cannot be relayed to Soviet investigators [8, p. 205‒206]. It should be noted, however, that this interrogation did not take place.

At the January session of the governmental commission, upon the proposal of Vasiliev, the issue of Japan’s preparation for biological warfare was determined to be appropriate for consideration by the Soviet prosecution in the tribunal [19, p. 43]. In February 1947, representatives from MacArthur’s staff appealed to Lieutenant-General Kuzma Derevyanko, a member of the Allied Council for Japan from the USSR, with the request to transfer two Japanese generals located in Soviet prison camps — Iketani and Kitazawa Teydžiro — in order to stand trial. It should be noted that this was a usual practice during the course of a trial. However, these requests were not always fulfilled, depending on each individual situation. In this case, the American request was met with strict conditions: to transfer custody of Shiro Ishii and Kioshi Oota to the USSR [20]. Derevyanko received a reply from MacArthur’s staff on April 16, 1947 which reported that Ishii and Oota would not be given to the USSR. The reason given for this refusal was peculiar: “...the Soviet Union, apparently, does not have clearly expressed interests in war crimes committed by the Japanese against Chinese and Manchurians” [21].

With the knowledge that the information given to them by Japanese military medics was incomplete, the American State Department decided to send a representative from Fort Detrick to Tokyo. This time it was Dr. Norbert Fell, who arrived April 15, 1947 [10, p. 199]. The new round of questioning of Ishii and his assistants explains Derevyanko’s reply from MacArthur’s staff.

Following a month-long investigation, the US Command of the Armed Forces in the Far East came to the conclusion that Ishii and his former workers must be guaranteed immunity from prosecution and that additional testimony could be received if they were convinced that all information would be classified [10, p. 200].

At the end of June 1947, Fell presented a detailed report his work. Included within it was a sixty page document (still classified to this day [10, p. 205]) that was worked on by nineteen key figures in the Japanese biological weapons program. In October two more representatives from Fort Detrick, doctors Edwin Hill and Joseph Victor, were sent to Japan gather more information [10, p. 201].

Meanwhile, in Soviet prisoner of war camps, the Ministry of Internal Affairs actively conducted
“operational work on the identification and interrogation of workers from epidemiological units of the Kwantung Army” [16, l. 105]. In all more than 1000 people were questioned [22].

In the summer of 1947 preparations were underway for the transfer of witnesses in Soviet custody from the USSR to the Tokyo trials [23, 24]. On September 1, 1947 the Governmental Commission ratified the decision “to consider it appropriate to propose the questioning of witnesses Kawashima, Karasawa, and Nishi in the Tribunal. However, the Commission has directed Comrade Vasiliev to probe the opinion of other prosecutors on this topic” and to report back with the results while Kruglov should “begin to prepare these witnesses” [25]. By October 24, however, the view of the members of the Commission had radically changed. In changing their decision from the 1st of September and “taking into account the opinion of the Minister of Internal Affairs Comrade Kruglov”, at the next session they resolved “to consider it inappropriate to send witnesses on the subject of biological warfare to Tokyo” [26].

We are unable to find in any documents an explanation for this sudden change in the Soviet position. It cannot be ruled out that Soviet spies in their search for information were able to find data on the activity of American military specialists present in Japan. After all, the Cold War was escalating at that time, increasing tensions in Soviet-American relations. It is enough to remember the events of 1947, such as the American advancement of the Truman Doctrine in March, the Marshall Plan in June, and the efforts of the Soviet leadership to create the Communist Information Bureau in September, among other things. All this and more served to intensify mutual mistrust, which put pressure on the situation in the Far East, eventually having an impact on the positions of the two countries with regards to the Japanese biological weapons program.

The idea of holding an independent trial on the territory of the USSR for Japanese prisoners of war identified as participants in the production of biological weapons dates back to the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948. On one hand, there was no doubt about the criminal nature of such activities and a significant amount of evidence had already been collected. On the other hand, the trial could be used by Soviet propaganda in the escalating ideological and political battle with the United States, who had by that time taken up a course of rapprochement with Japan.

It should be noted that directly following the capitulation of Japan, the American government sent General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, a “directive in relation to the identification, arrest, and trial of persons suspected of committing war crimes”, the seventh paragraph of which permitted the organization of such a court. It indicated that “the military command of any nation participating in the occupance of Japan may create special military tribunals for hearings of war criminals who are not detained or are not required by MacArthur for examination of their cases by an international court or tribunal” [15, p. 151].

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR took the initiative in organizing a tribunal. It is known that Kruglov made the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aware of the tribunal on February 19, 1948. An answer signed by Andrei Vyshinsky spoke of fundamental agreement, but proposed “to complete in full the preliminary investigation of the case” [28].

On September 30, 1949, a letter signed by Kruglov and Gromyko, marked “secret” was sent in the name of Stalin to the First Deputy Minister of International Affairs. In the letter it was noted that “materials in the possession of investigative agencies of the MVD of the USSR give sufficient basis for the staging of an open trial of the commanders of ‘Anti-epidemic Unit No. 731’” [29]. Attached to the letter was a draft of a secret decree from the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Already on October 8, 1949 the matter was heard at a session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the draft of the secret decree of the Council of Ministers was approved [30]. After the ratification of the decision on the highest level, the Ministry of Internal Affairs began to work intensively on the organization of the trial.

On October 20, 1949 questioning of Japanese prisoners began in Khabarovsky. According to Anatoly Protasov, the working translator, the presence of a representative from a group of visiting Moscow microbiologists was required at every interrogation. Soviet specialists noted
that the Japanese had advanced relatively far in their bacteriological research. In the words of Protasov, the investigation was conducted “according to international standards.” The interrogations culminated at 18:00, and the defendants were allowed breaks for lunch and tea. Archived documents testify to the fact that, more often than not, memory failed the subjects of investigation. According to investigation protocol, questioning was often conducted at night, which is entirely consistent with the practice of the time.

At first the prisoners were questioned as witnesses, but on October 30, 1949 they were charged under Article 58-4 of the RSFSR. However, in December, by decree of the military attorney, the charges were re-qualified, which required the acceptance of a supplement to the secret decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from October 8, 1949 [31]. The final charge was filed under p. 1 of the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from April 19, 1943 “On the methods of punishment for German-Fascist fiends guilty of murder and the torture of the Soviet civilian population and captive Red Army soldiers, for spies, traitors to the Motherland from among Soviet citizens, and for their accomplices.” It is difficult for non-specialists to judge the lawfulness of adopting this document as a basis for prosecuting former Japanese servicemen. At the very least we are not aware of any objections from the ranks of lawyers on this matter [32‒34].

The Khabarovsk Trial began on December 25, 1949 and lasted six days (until December 30). The case was heard in an open court session by the Military Tribunal of the Maritime Military Region. During the trial, a forensic examination was carried out under the supervision of a full member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, Nikolai Zhukov-Verezhnikov. Twelve men sat on the defendants bench [18].

In a prepared indictment based on materials from the preliminary investigation it was noted that in 1935‒1936, on the order of Emperor Hirohito, two formations designed for the development and implementation of biological warfare were deployed to Manchuria. One of them, organized around Ishii’s laboratory, was assigned the designation “Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung Army,” and the other was termed the “Warhorse Disease Prevention Department of the Kwantung Army”. In 1941, after Hitler’s Germany attacked the USSR, these institutions were encrypted as “Unit No. 731” and “Unit No. 100,” respectfully [18, p. 8‒9].

During the course of the trial, the testimonies of the defendants, witnesses, and selected experts were heard in addition to the speeches of the government prosecutor and defending attorney. All of the defendants made their final remarks in which they professed their guilt (the defendant Sato professed only partial guilt). In accordance with the verdict, prisoners of war Yamada, Kajitsuka, Takahashi, and Kawashima received 25 years in corrective labor camps, Karasawa and Sato – 20 years, Onoue – 12 years, Mitomo – 15 years, Hiradzakura – 10 years, Kurushima – 3 years, and Kikuchi – 2 years.

General Yamada served his sentence in Camp No. 48, a facility in the Ivanovsky Region which was reserved for generals [35]. Kawashima, Kajitsuka, Takahashi, and Sato were also sent there. Those who were sentenced to shorter terms, more often than not, served the full extent of their time in Soviet camps. The rest, if they remained alive, became subject to the Declaration of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on amnesty for Japanese citizens convicted in the USSR from December 13, 1956 and were deported to their homeland. This corresponded with Article 5 of the joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Restoration of Diplomatic and Consular Relations, signed October 19, 1956 in Moscow [26].

Finally, we should note that the reconstruction of the history of the lead up to the Khabarovsk Trial of 1949 cannot be considered complete due to the inaccessibility of many archival documents. Moreover, it is obvious that the respective positions of the USSR and USA in relation to Japanese war criminals who worked on the development of biological weapons was influenced by the budding Cold War. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the Khabarovsk Trials played an important role in the unmasking of the criminal activities of the Japanese Army.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEp0SKLvG7E
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